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Abstract—We consider a distributed stochastic approxi-
mation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a
stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ dimin-
ishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not
summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance
for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties
of the problem and naive choices (such as γk = 1/k) generally
do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems.
While a centralized adaptive stepsize SA scheme is proposed in
[1] for the optimization framework, such a scheme provides
no freedom for the agents in choosing their own stepsizes.
Thus, a direct application of centralized stepsize schemes is
impractical in solving Nash games. Furthermore, extensions
to game-theoretic regimes where players may independently
choose steplength sequences are limited to recent work by
Koshal et al. [2]. Motivated by these shortcomings, we present
a distributed algorithm in which each player updates his
steplength based on the previous steplength and some problem
parameters. The steplength rules are derived from minimizing
an upper bound of the errors associated with players’ decisions.
It is shown that these rules generate sequences that converge
almost surely to an equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game.
Importantly, variants of this rule are suggested where players
independently select steplength sequences while abiding by
an overall coordination requirement. Preliminary numerical
results are seen to be promising.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a class of stochastic Nash games in which ev-
ery player solves a stochastic convex program parametrized
by adversarial strategies. Consider an N -person stochastic
Nash game in which the ith player solves the parametrized
convex problem
min
x∈Xi
E[fi(xi, x−i, ξi)] , (1)
where x−i denotes the collection {xj , j 6= i} of decisions
of all players other than player i. For each i, the vector
ξi : Ωi → Rni is a random vector with a probability
distribution on some set, while the function E[fi(xi, x−i, ξi)]
is strongly convex in xi for all x−i ∈
∏
j 6=iXj . For every
i, the set Xi ⊆ Rni is closed and convex. We focus
on the resulting stochastic variational inequality (VI) and
consider the development of distributed stochastic approxi-
mation schemes that rely on adaptive steplength sequences.
Stochastic approximation techniques have a long tradition.
First proposed by Robbins and Monro [3] for differentiable
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functions and Ermoliev [4]–[6], significant effort has been
applied towards theoretical and algorithmic examination of
such schemes (cf. [7], [8]). Yet, there has been markedly little
on the application of such techniques to solution of stochastic
variational inequalities. Exceptions include the work by Jiang
and Xu [9], and more recently by Koshal et al. [2]. The
latter, in particular, develops a single timescale stochastic
approximation scheme for precisely the class of problems
being studied here viz. monotone stochastic Nash games.
Standard stochastic approximation schemes provide little
guidance regarding the choice of a steplength sequence, apart
from requiring that the sequence, denoted by {γk}, satisfies∑∞
k=1 γk =∞ and
∑∞
k=1 γ
2
k <∞. This paper is motivated
by the need to develop adaptive steplength sequences that
can be independently chosen by players under a limited
coordination, while guaranteeing the overall convergence of
the scheme. Adaptive stepsizes have been effectively used
in gradient and subgradient algorithms. Vrahatis et al. [10]
presented a class of gradient algorithms with adaptive step-
sizes for unconstrained minimization. Spall [11] developed a
general adaptive SA algorithm based on using a simultaneous
perturbation approach for estimating the Hessian matrix.
Cicek et al. [12] considered the Kiefer-Wolfowitz (KW) SA
algorithm and derived general upper bounds on its mean-
squared error, together with an adaptive version of the KW
algorithm. Ram et al. [13] considered distributed stochastic
subgradient algorithms for convex optimization problems and
studied the effects of stochastic errors on the convergence
of the proposed algorithm. Lizarraga et al. [14] considered
a family of two person Mutil-Plant game and developed
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium conditions based on the Ro-
bust Maximum Principle. More recently, Yousefian et al.
[1], [15] developed centralized adaptive stepsize SA schemes
for solving stochastic optimization problems and variational
inequalities. The main contribution of the current paper lies
in developing a class of distributed adaptive stepsize rules
for SA scheme in which each agent chooses its own stepsizes
without any specific information about other agents stepsize
policy. This degree of freedom in choosing the stepsizes has
not been addressed in the centralized schemes.
Before proceeding, we briefly motivate the question of
distributed computation of Nash equilibria from two different
standpoints: (i) First, the Nash game can be viewed as a com-
petitive analog of a stochastic multi-user convex optimiza-
tion problem of the form minx∈X
∑N
i=1 E[fi(xi, x−i, ξi)] .
Furthermore, under the assumption that equilibria of the
associated stochastic Nash game are efficient, our scheme
provides a distributed framework for computing solutions
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to this problem. In such a setting, we may prescribe that
players employ stochastic approximation schemes since the
Nash game represents an engineered construct employed for
computing solutions; (ii) A second perspective is one drawn
from a bounded rationality approach towards distributed
computation of Nash equilibria. A fully rational avenue
for computing equilibria suggests that each player employs
a best response mapping in updating strategies, based on
what the competing players are doing. Yet, when faced by
computational or time constraints, players may instead take a
gradient step. We work in precisely this regime but allow for
flexibility in terms of the steplengths chosen by the players.
In this paper, we consider the solution of a stochastic Nash
game whose equilibria are completely captured by a stochas-
tic variational inequality with a strongly monotone mapping.
Motivated by the need for efficient distributed simulation
methods for computing solutions to such problems, we
present a distributed scheme in which each player employs an
adaptive rule for prescribing steplengths. Importantly, these
rules can be implemented with relatively little coordination
by any given player and collectively lead to iterates that are
shown to converge to the unique equilibrium in an almost-
sure sense.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the formulation of a stochastic Nash games in
which every player solves a stochastic convex problem. In
Section III, we show the almost-sure convergence of the
SA algorithm under specified assumptions. In Section IV,
motivated by minimizing a suitably defined error bound,
we develop an adaptive steplength stochastic approximation
framework in which every player adaptively updates his
steplength. It is shown that the choice of adaptive steplength
rules can be obtained independently by each player under a
limited coordination. Finally, in Section V, we provide some
numerical results from a stochastic flow management game
drawn from a communication network setting.
Notation: Throughout this paper, a vector x is assumed to
be a column vector. We write xT to denote the transpose of a
vector x. ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm, i.e., ‖x‖ =√
xTx. We use ΠX(x) to denote the Euclidean projection of
a vector x on a set X , i.e., ‖x−ΠX(x)‖ = miny∈X ‖x−y‖.
Vector g is a subgradient of a convex function f with domain
domf at x¯ ∈ domf when f(x¯) + gT (x− x¯) ≤ f(x) for all
x ∈ domf. The set of all subgradients of f at x¯ is denoted by
∂f(x¯). We write a.s. as the abbreviation for “almost surely”,
and use E[z] to denote the expectation of a random variable z.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present (sufficient) conditions associ-
ated with equilibrium points of the stochastic Nash game
defined by (1). The equilibrium conditions of this game
can be characterized by a stochastic variational inequality
problem denoted by VI(X,F ), where
F (x) ,
 ∇x1E[f1(x, ξ1)]...
∇xNE[fN (x, ξN )]
 , X = N∏
i=1
Xi, (2)
with x , (x1, . . . , xN )T and xi ∈ Xi⊆ Rni for i =
1, . . . , N . Given a set X ⊆ Rn and a single-valued mapping
F : X → Rn, then a vector x∗ ∈ X solves a variational
inequality VI(X,F ), if
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X. (3)
Let n =
∑N
i=1 ni, and note that when the sets Xi are convex
and closed for all i, the set X ∈ Rn is closed and convex.
In the context of solving the stochastic variational in-
equality VI(X,F ) in (2)-(3), suppose each player employs
a stochastic approximation scheme for given by
xk+1,i = ΠXi (xk,i − γk,i(Fi(xk) + wk,i)) ,
wk,i , Fˆi(xk, ξk)− Fi(xk),
(4)
for all k ≥ 0 and i = 1, . . . , N , where γk,i > 0 is the stepsize
of the ith player at iteration k, xk = (xk,1 xk,2 . . . xk,N )T ,
ξk = (ξk,1 ξk,2 . . . ξk,N )
T , Fi = E[∇xifi(x, ξi)], and
Fˆ (x, ξ) ,
 ∇x1f1(x, ξ1)...
∇xN fN (x, ξN )
 , ξ ,
 ξ1...
ξN
 .
Note that in terms of the definition of wk,i, Fi, and Fˆi,
E[wk,i | Fk] = 0. In addition, x0 ∈ X is a random initial
vector independent of the random variable ξ and such that
E
[‖x0‖2] < ∞. Note that each player uses its individual
stepsize to update its decision.
III. A DISTRIBUTED SA SCHEME
In this section, we present conditions under which algo-
rithm (4) converges almost surely to the solution of game
(1) under suitable assumptions on the mapping. Also, we
develop a distributed variant of a standard stochastic ap-
proximation scheme and provide conditions on the steplength
sequences that lead to almost-sure convergence of the iterates
to the unique solution. Our assumptions include requirements
on the set X and the mapping F .
Assumption 1: Assume the following:
(a) The sets Xi ⊆ Rni are closed and convex.
(b) F (x) is strongly monotone with constant η > 0 and
Lipschitz continuous with constant L over the set X .
Remark: The strong monotonicity is assumed to hold
throughout the paper. Although the convergence results
may still hold with a weaker assumption, such as strict
monotonicity, but the stepsize policy in this paper leverages
the strong monotonicity parameter which prescribes a more
parametrized stepsize rule. This is the main reason that we
assumed the stronger version of monotonicity. In Section V,
we present an example where such an assumption is satisfied.
Another set of assumptions is for the stepsizes employed
by each player in algorithm (4).
Assumption 2: Assume that:
(a) The stepsize sequences are such that γk,i > 0 for all
k and i, with
∑∞
k=0 γk,i =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k,i <∞.
(b) There exists a scalar β such that 0 ≤ β < ηL and
Γk−δk
δk
≤ β for all k ≥ 0, where δk and Γk are (fixed)
2
positive sequences satisfying δk ≤ mini=1,...,N γk,i
and Γk ≥ maxi=1,...,N γk,i for all k ≥ 0.
We let Fk denote the history of the method up to time k,
i.e., Fk = {x0, ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξk−1} for k ≥ 1 and F0 = {x0}.
Consider the following assumption on the stochastic errors,
wk, of the algorithm.
Assumption 3: The errors wk are such that for some
constant ν > 0,
E
[‖wk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2 a.s. for all k ≥ 0.
We use the Robbins-Siegmund lemma in establishing the
convergence of method (4), which can be found in [16]
(cf. Lemma 10, page 49).
Lemma 1: Let {vk} be a sequence of nonnegative random
variables, where E[v0] < ∞, and let {αk} and {µk} be
deterministic scalar sequences such that:
E[vk+1|v0, . . . , vk] ≤ (1− αk)vk + µk a.s. for all k ≥ 0,
0 ≤ αk ≤ 1, µk ≥ 0,
∞∑
k=0
αk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
µk <∞, lim
k→∞
µk
αk
= 0.
Then, vk → 0 almost surely.
The following lemma provides an error bound for algo-
rithm (4) under Assumption 1.
Lemma 2: Consider algorithm (4). Let Assumption 1
hold. Then, the following relation holds a.s. for all k ≥ 0:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ Γ2kE[‖wk‖2 | Fk]
+ (1− 2(η + L)δk + 2LΓk + L2Γ2k)‖xk − x∗‖2. (5)
Proof: By Assumption 1a, the set X is closed and
convex. Since F is strongly monotone, the existence and
uniqueness of the solution to VI(X,F ) is guaranteed by The-
orem 2.3.3 of [17]. Let x∗ denote the solution of VI(X,F ).
From properties of projection operator, we know that a vector
x∗ solves VI(X,F ) problem if and only if x∗ satisfies
x∗ = ΠX(x∗ − γF (x∗)) for any γ > 0.
From algorithm (4) and the non-expansiveness property of
the projection operator, we have for all k ≥ 0 and i,
‖xk+1,i − x∗i ‖2 = ‖ΠXi(xk,i − γk,i(Fi(xk) + wk,i))
−ΠXi(x∗i − γk,iFi(x∗))‖2
≤ ‖xk,i − x∗i − γk,i(Fi(xk) + wk,i − Fi(x∗))‖2.
Taking the expectation conditioned on the past, and using
E[wk,i | Fk] = 0, we have
E
[‖xk+1,i − x∗i ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖xk,i − x∗i ‖2
+ γ2k,i‖Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗)‖2 + γ2k,iE
[‖wk,i‖2 | Fk]
− 2γk,i(xk,i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗)).
Now, by summing the preceding relations over i, we have
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2
+
N∑
i=1
γ2k,i‖Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+
N∑
i=1
γ2k,iE
[‖wk,i‖2 | Fk]
−2
N∑
i=1
γk,i(xk,i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
. (6)
Next, we estimate Term 1 and Term 2 in (6). By using the
definition of Γk and by leveraging the Lipschitzian property
of mapping F , we obtain
Term 1 ≤ Γ2k‖F (xk)− F (x∗)‖2 ≤ Γ2kL2‖xk − x∗‖2. (7)
Adding and subtracting −2∑Ni=1 δk(xk,i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk) −
Fi(x
∗)) from Term 2, we further obtain
Term 2 ≤− 2δk(xk − x∗)T (F (xk)− F (x∗))
− 2
N∑
i=1
(γk,i − δk)(xk,i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗)).
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we obtain
Term 2 ≤− 2δk(xk − x∗)T (F (xk)− F (x∗))
+ 2(γk,i − δk)
N∑
i=1
‖xk,i − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk)− Fi(x∗)‖
≤ − 2δk(xk − x∗)T (F (xk)− F (x∗))
+ 2(Γk − δk)‖xk − x∗‖‖F (xk)− F (x∗)‖,
where in the last relation, we use Ho¨lder’s inequality. Invok-
ing the strong monotonicity of the mapping for bounding the
first term and by utilizing the Lipschitzian property of the
second term of the preceding relation, we have
Term 2 ≤ −2ηδk‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(Γk − δk)L‖xk − x∗‖2.
The desired inequality is obtained by combining relations (6)
and (7) with the preceding inequality .
We next prove that algorithm (4) generates a sequence
of iterates that converges a.s. to the unique solution of
VI(X,F ), as seen in the following proposition. Our proof
of this result makes use of Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 (Almost-sure convergence): Consider the
algorithm 4. Let Assumption 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then,
(a) The following relation holds a.s. for all k ≥ 0:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1 + β)2δ2kν2
+ (1− 2(η − βL)δk + (1 + β)2L2δ2k)E
[‖xk − x∗‖2] .
(b) The sequence {xk} generated by algorithm (4), con-
verges a.s. to the unique solution of VI(X,F ).
Proof: (a) Assumption 2b implies that Γk ≤ (1+β)δk.
Combining this with inequality (5), we obtain
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1− 2(η − βL)δk + (1 + β)2L2δ2k)‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (1 + β)2δ2kE
[‖wk‖2 | Fk] , for all k ≥ 0.
3
Taking expectations in the preceding inequality and using
Assumption 3, we obtain the desired relation.
(b) We show that the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied in
order to claim almost sure convergence of xk to x∗. Let us
define vk , ‖xk+1−x∗‖2, αk , 2(η−βL)δk−L2δ2k(1+β)2,
and µk , (1+β)2δ2kE
[‖wk‖2 | Fk]. Since γk,i tends to zero
for any i = 1, . . . , N , we may conclude that δk goes to zero
as k grows. Recall that αk is given by
αk = 2(η − βL)δk
(
1− (1 + β)
2L2δk
2(η − βL)
)
.
Due to δk → 0, for all k large enough, say k > k1, we have
1− (1 + β)
2L2δk
2(η − βL) > 0.
Since β < ηL (Assumption 2b), it follows η−βL > 0. Thus,
we have αk ≥ 0. Also, for k large enough, say k > k2, we
have αk ≤ 1. Therefore, when k > max{k1, k2} we have
0 ≤ αk ≤ 1. Obviously, vk, µk ≥ 0. From Assumption 2a
and Assumption 3 it follows
∑
k µk <∞. We also have
lim
k→∞
µk
αk
= lim
k→∞
(1 + β)2δ2kE
[‖wk‖2 | Fk]
2(η − βL)δk
(
1− (1+β)2L2δk2(η−βL)
)
= lim
k→∞
(1 + β)2δkE
[‖wk‖2 | Fk]
2(η − βL) .
Since the term E
[‖wk‖2 | Fk] is bounded by ν2 (Assump-
tion 3) and δk → 0, we see that limk→∞ µkαk = 0. Hence,
the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied, which implies that
xk converges to the unique solution, x∗, almost surely.
Consider now a special form of algorithm (4) correspond-
ing to the case when all players employ the same stepsize,
i.e., γk,i = γk for all k. Then, the algorithm (4) reduces to
the following:
xk+1 = ΠX (xk − γk(F (xk) + wk)) ,
wk , Fˆ (xk, ξk)− F (xk),
(8)
for all k ≥ 0. Observe that when γk,i = γk for all k, Assump-
tion 2a is satisfied when
∑∞
k=0 γk =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k <∞.
Assumption 2b is automatically satisfied with Γk = δk = γk
and β = 0. Hence, as a direct consequence of Proposition 1,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Identical stepsizes): Consider algorithm (8).
Let Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Also, let
∑∞
k=0 γk =∞ and∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k <∞. Then,
(a) The following relation holds almost surely:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1− 2ηγk + L2γ2k)E[‖xk − x∗‖2]
+ γ2kν
2.
(b) The sequence {xk} generated by algorithm (8), con-
verges a.s. to the unique solution of VI(X,F ).
IV. A DISTRIBUTED ADAPTIVE STEPLENGTH SA SCHEME
Stochastic approximation algorithms require stepsize se-
quences to be square summable but not summable. These
algorithms provide little advice regarding the choice of such
sequences. One of the most common choices has been the
harmonic steplength rule which takes the form of γk = θk
where θ > 0 is a constant. Although, this choice guarantees
almost-sure convergence, it does not leverage problem pa-
rameters. Numerically, it has been observed that such choices
can perform quite poorly in practice. Motivated by this short-
coming, we present a distributed adaptive steplength scheme
for algorithm (4) which guarantees almost-sure convergence
of xk to the unique solution of VI(X,F ). It is derived from
the minimizer of a suitably defined error bound and leads to
a recursive relation; more specifically, at each step, the new
stepsize is calculated using the stepsize from the preceding
iteration and problem parameters. To begin our analysis, we
consider the result of Proposition 1a for all k ≥ 0:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1 + β)2δ2kν2
+ (1− 2(η − βL)δk + (1 + β)2L2δ2k)E
[‖xk − x∗‖2] . (9)
When the stepsizes are further restricted so that
0 < δk ≤ η − βL
(1 + β)2L2
,
we have
1− 2(η − βL)δk + L2(1 + β)2δ2k ≤ 1− (η − βL)δk.
Thus, for 0 < δk ≤ η−βL(1+β)2L2 , from inequality (9) we obtain
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1− (η − βL)δk)E[‖xk − x∗‖2]
+ (1 + β)2δ2kν
2 for all k ≥ 0. (10)
Let us view the quantity E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] as an error ek+1
of the method arising from the use of the stepsize values
δ0, δ1, . . . , δk. Relation (10) gives us an estimate of the error
of algorithm (4). We use this estimate to develop an adaptive
stepsize procedure. Consider the worst case which is the case
when (10) holds with equality. In this worst case, the error
satisfies the following recursive relation:
ek+1 = (1− (η − βL)δk)ek + (1 + β2)δ2kν2.
Let us assume that we want to run the algorithm (4)
for a fixed number of iterations, say K. The preceding
relation shows that eK depends on the stepsize values up
to the Kth iteration. This motivates us to see the stepsize
parameters as decision variables that can minimize a suitably
defined error bound of the algorithm. Thus, the variables are
δ0, δ1, . . . , δK−1 and the objective function is the error func-
tion eK(δ0, δ1, . . . , δK−1). We proceed to derive a stepsize
rule by minimizing the error eK+1; Importantly, δK+1 can be
shown to be a function of only the most recent stepsize δK .
We define the real-valued error function ek(δ0, δ1, . . . , δk−1)
by the upper bound in (10):
ek+1(δ0, . . . , δk) ,(1− (η − βL)δk)ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1)
+ (1 + β2)δ2kν
2 for all k ≥ 0,
(11)
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where e0 is a positive scalar, η is the strong monotonicity
parameter and ν2 is the upper bound for the second moments
of the error norms ‖wk‖.
Now, let us consider the stepsize sequence {δ∗k} given by
δ∗0 =
η − βL
2(1 + β)2ν2
e0 (12)
δ∗k = δ
∗
k−1
(
1− η − βL
2
δ∗k−1
)
for all k ≥ 1. (13)
In what follows, we often abbreviate ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1) by ek
whenever this is unambiguous. The next proposition shows
that the lower bound sequence of γk,i given by (12)–(13)
minimizes the errors ek over (0, η−βL(1+β)2L2 ]
k.
Proposition 2: Let ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1) be defined as in (11),
where e0 > 0 is such that e0 < 2ν
2
L2 , and L is the Lipschitz
constant of mapping F . Let the sequence {δ∗k} be given by
(12)–(13). Then, the following hold:
(a) ek(δ∗0 , . . . , δ
∗
k) =
2(1+β)2ν2
η−βL δ
∗
k for all k ≥ 0.
(b) For any k ≥ 1, the vector (δ∗0 , δ∗1 , . . . , δ∗k−1) is the
minimizer of the function ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1) over the set
Gk ,
{
α ∈ Rk : 0 < αj ≤ η − βL
(1 + β)2L2
, j = 1, . . . , k
}
,
i.e., for any k ≥ 1 and (δ0, . . . , δk−1) ∈ Gk:
ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1)− ek(δ∗0 , . . . , δ∗k−1)
≥ (1 + β)2ν2(δk−1 − δ∗k−1)2.
Proof:
(a) To show the result, we use induction on k. Trivially,
it holds for k = 0 from (12). Now, suppose that we have
ek(δ
∗
0 , . . . , δ
∗
k−1) =
2(1+β)2ν2
η−βL δ
∗
k for some k, and consider
the case for k+1. From the definition of the error ek in (11)
and the inductive hypothesis, we have
ek+1(δ
∗
0 , . . . , δ
∗
k) = (1− (η − βL)δ∗k)
2(1 + β)2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k
+ (1 + β)2(δ∗k)
2ν2
=
2(1 + β)2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k
(
1− η − βL
2
δ∗k
)
=
2(1 + β)2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k+1,
where the last equality follows by the definition of δ∗k+1
in (13). Hence, the result holds for all k ≥ 0.
(b) First we need to show that (δ∗0 , . . . , δ
∗
k−1) ∈ Gk. By the
choice of e0, i.e. e0 < 2ν
2
L2 , we have that 0 < δ
∗
0 ≤ η−βL(1+β)2L2 .
Using induction, from relations (12)–(13), it can be shown
that 0 < δ∗k < δ
∗
k−1 for all k ≥ 1. Thus, (δ∗0 , . . . , δ∗k−1) ∈ Gk
for all k ≥ 1. Using induction on k, we now show that vector
(δ∗0 , δ
∗
1 , . . . , δ
∗
k−1) minimizes the error ek for all k ≥ 1. From
the definition of the error e1 and the relation
e1(δ
∗
0) =
2(1 + β)2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
1
shown in part (a), we have
e1(δ0)− e1(δ∗0) = (1− (η − βL)δ0)e0 + (1 + β)2ν2δ20
− 2(1 + β)
2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
1 .
Using δ∗1 = δ
∗
0
(
1− η−βL2 δ∗0
)
, we obtain
e1(δ0)− e1(δ∗0) = (1− (η − βL)γ0)e0 + (1 + β)2ν2δ20
− 2(1 + β)
2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
0 + (1 + β)
2ν2(δ∗0)
2.
where the last equality follows from e0 =
2(1+β)2ν2
η−βL δ
∗
0 .
Thus, we have
e1(δ0)− e1(δ∗0) = (1 + β)2ν2
(−2δ0δ∗0 + δ20 + (δ∗0)2)
= (1 + β)2ν2 (δ0 − δ∗0)2 ,
and the inductive hypothesis holds for k = 1. Now, sup-
pose that ek(δ0, . . . , δk−1) ≥ ek(δ∗0 , . . . , δ∗k−1) holds for
some k and any (δ0, . . . , δk−1) ∈ Gk, and we need to
show that ek+1(δ0, . . . , δk) ≥ ek+1(δ∗0 , . . . , δ∗k) holds for all
(δ0, . . . , δk) ∈ Gk+1. To simplify the notation, we use e∗k+1
to denote the error ek+1 evaluated at (δ∗0 , δ
∗
1 , . . . , δ
∗
k), and
ek+1 when evaluating at an arbitrary vector (δ0, δ1, . . . , δk) ∈
Gk+1. Using (11) and part (a), we have
ek+1 − e∗k+1 = (1− (η − βL)δk)ek + (1 + β)2ν2δ2k
− 2(1 + β)
2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k+1.
Under the inductive hypothesis, we have ek ≥ e∗k. It can be
shown easily that when (δ0, δ1, . . . , δk) ∈ Gk, we have 0 <
1−(η−βL)δk < 1. Using this, the relation e∗k = 2(1+β)
2ν2
η−βL γ
∗
k
of part (a), and the definition of δ∗k+1, we obtain
ek+1 − e∗k+1 ≥ (1− (η − βL)δk)
2(1 + β)2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k
+ (1 + β)2ν2δ2k
− 2(1 + β)
2ν2
η − βL δ
∗
k
(
1− η − βL
2
δ∗k
)
= (1 + β)2ν2(δk − δ∗k)2.
Hence, ek − e∗k ≥ (1 + β)2ν2(δk−1 − δ∗k−1)2 holds for all
k ≥ 1 and all (δ0, . . . , δk−1) ∈ Gk.
We have just provided an analysis in terms of the lower
bound sequence {δk}. We can conduct a similar analysis for
{Γk} and obtain the corresponding adaptive stepsize scheme
using the following relation:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ Γ2kν2
+ (1− 2(η + L)
1 + β
Γk + 2LΓk + L
2Γ2k)E
[‖xk − x∗‖2] .
When 0 < Γk ≤ η−βL(1+β)L2 , we have
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ (1− (η − βL)
1 + β
Γk)E
[‖xk − x∗‖2]
+ Γ2kν
2 for all k ≥ 0.
(14)
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Using relation (14) and following similar approach in Propo-
sition 2, we obtain the sequence {Γ∗k} given by
Γ∗0 =
η − βL
2(1 + β)ν2
e0 (15)
Γ∗k = Γ
∗
k−1
(
1− η − βL
2(1 + β)
Γ∗k−1
)
for all k ≥ 1. (16)
Note that the adaptive stepsize sequence given by (15)–
(16) converges to zero and moreover, it is not summable
but squared summable (cf. [1], Proposition 3). In the fol-
lowing lemma, we derive a relation between two recursive
sequences, which we use later to obtain our main recursive
stepsize scheme.
Lemma 3: Suppose that sequences {λk} and {γk} are
given with the following recursive equations for all k ≥ 0,
λk+1 = λk(1− λk), and γk+1 = γk(1− cγk),
where λ0 = cγ0, 0 < γ0 < 1c , and c > 0. Then for all k ≥ 0,
λk = cγk.
Proof: We use induction on k. For k = 0, the relation
holds since λ0 = cγ0. Suppose that for some k ≥ 0 the
relation holds. Then, we have
γk+1 = γk(1− cγk) ⇒ cγk+1 = cγk(1− cγk)
⇒ cγk+1 = λk(1− λk)
⇒ γk+1 = λk+1. (17)
Hence, the result holds for k + 1 implying that the result
holds for all k ≥ 0.
Next, we show a relation for the sequences {δ∗k} and {Γ∗k}.
Lemma 4: Suppose that sequences {δ∗k} and {Γ∗k} are
given by relations (12)–(13) and (15)–(16) and e0 < 2ν
2
L2 .
Then for all k ≥ 0, Γ∗k = (1 + β)δ∗k.
Proof: Suppose that {λk} is defined by λk+1 =
λk(1− λk), for allk ≥ 0, where λ0 = (η−βL)
2
4(1+β)2ν2 e0. In what
follows, we apply Lemma 3 twice to obtain the result. By
the definition of λ0 and δ∗0 , we have that λ0 =
(η−βL)
2 δ
∗
0 .
Also, using e0 < 2ν
2
L2 and definition of λ0, we obtain
λ0 =
(η − βL)2
4(1 + β)2ν2
e0 <
(η − βL)2
2(1 + β)2L2
≤ η
2
2L2
< 1.
Therefore, the conditions of Lemma 3 hold for sequences
{λk} and {δ∗k}. Hence, Lemma 3 yields that for all k ≥ 0,
λk =
(η − βL)
2
δ∗k.
Similarly, invoking Lemma 3 again, we have λk =
(η−βL)
2(1+β) Γ
∗
k. Therefore, from the two preceding relations, we
can conclude the desired relation. Therefore, for all k ≥ 0,
Γ∗k = (1 + β)δ
∗
k.
The earlier set of results are essentially adaptive rules for de-
termining the upper and lower bound of stepsize sequences,
i.e. {δ∗k} and {Γ∗k}. The next proposition proposes recursive
stepsize schemes for each player of game (1).
Proposition 3: [Distributed adaptive steplength SA rules]
Suppose that Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Assume that set
X is bounded, i.e. there exists a positive constant D ,
maxx,y∈X ‖x−y‖. Suppose that the stepsizes for any player
i = 1, . . . , N are given by the following recursive equations
Suppose that Assumption 1 and 3 hold. Assume that set
X is bounded, i.e. there exists a positive constant D ,
maxx,y∈X ‖x−y‖. Suppose that the stepsizes for any player
i = 1, . . . , N are given by the following recursive equations
γ0,i = ri
c
(1 + η−2cL )
2ν2
D2 (18)
γk,i = γk−1,i
(
1− c
ri
γk−1,i
)
for all k ≥ 1. (19)
where ri is an arbitrary parameter associated with ith player
such that ri ∈ [1, 1 + η−2cL ], c is an arbitrary fixed constant
0 < c < η2 , L is the Lipschitz constant of mapping F ,
and ν is the upper bound given by Assumption 3 such that
D <
√
2 νL . Then, the following hold:
(a) γk,iri =
γk,j
rj
for any i, j = 1, . . . , N and k ≥ 0.
(b) Assumption 2b holds with β = η−2cL , δk = δ
∗
k, Γk =
Γ∗k, and e0 = D
2, where δ∗k and Γ
∗
k are given by (12)–
(13) and (15)–(16) respectively.
(c) The sequence {xk} generated by algorithm (4) con-
verges a.s. to the unique solution of stochastic
VI(X,F ).
(d) The results of Proposition 2 hold for δ∗k when e0 = D
2.
Proof: (a) Consider the sequence {λk} given by
λ0 =
c2
(1 + η−2cL )
2ν2
D2,
λk+1 = λk(1− λk), for all k ≥ 1.
Since for any i = 1, . . . , N , we have λ0 = cri γ0,i, using
Lemma 3, we obtain that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and k ≥ 0,
λk =
c
ri
γk,i.
Therefore, for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , we obtain the desired
relation in part (a).
(b) First we show that δ∗k and Γ
∗
k are well defined. Consider
the relation of part (a). Let k ≥ 0 be arbitrarily fixed.
If γk,i > γk,j for some i 6= j, then we have ri >
rj . Therefore, the minimum possible γk,i is obtained with
ri = 1 and the maximum possible γk,i is obtained with
ri = 1 +
η−2c
L . Now, consider (18)–(19). If, ri = 1, and
D2 is replaced by e0, and c by η−βL2 , we get the same
recursive sequence defined by (12)–(13). Therefore, since
the minimum possible γk,i is achieved when ri = 1, we
conclude that δ∗k ≤ mini=1,...,N γk,i for any k ≥ 0. This
shows that δ∗k is well-defined in the context of Assumption
2b. Similarly, it can be shown that Γ∗k is also well-defined
in the context of Assumption 2b. Now, Lemma 4 implies
that Γ∗k = (1 +
η−2c
L )δ
∗
k for any k ≥ 0, which shows that
Assumption 2b is satisfied since β = η−2cL and 0 < c <
η
2 .
(c) In view of Proposition 1, to show the almost-sure conver-
gence, it suffices to show that Assumption 2 holds. Part (b)
implies that Assumption 2b holds for the specified choices.
Since γk,i is a recursive sequence for each i, Assumption 2a
holds using Proposition 3 in [1].
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(d) Since D <
√
2 νL , it follows that e0 <
2ν2
L2 , which shows
that the conditions of Proposition 2 are satisfied.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of our numerical
experiments on a stochastic bandwidth-sharing problem in
communication networks (Sec. V-A). We compare the per-
formance of the distributed adaptive stepsize SA scheme
(DASA) given by (18)–(19) with that of SA schemes with
harmonic stepsize sequences (HSA), where agents use the
stepsize θk at iteration k. More precisely, we consider three
different values of the parameter θ, i.e., θ = 0.1, 1, and 10.
This diversity of choices allows us to observe the sensitivity
of the HSA scheme to different settings of the parameters.
A. A bandwidth-sharing problem in computer networks
We consider a communication network where users com-
pete for the bandwidth. Such a problem can be captured
by an optimization framework (cf. [18]). Motivated by this
model, we consider a network with 16 nodes, 20 links and
5 users. Figure 1 shows the configuration of this network.
Users have access to different routes as shown in Figure 1.
Link 13 Link 6 
Link 3 
Route 4 
Route 5 
Route 1 Route 2 
Route 3 
Route 6 
Route7 
Route 8 
Route 9 
User 1 
User 2 
User 3 User 4 
User 5 
Li
n
k 
1
6
 
Fig. 1: The network
For example, user 1 can access routes 1, 2, and 3. Each
user is characterized by a cost function. Additionally, there
is a congestion cost function that depends on the aggregate
flow. More specifically, the cost function user i with flow
rate (bandwidth) xi is defined by
fi(xi, ξi) , −
∑
r∈R(i)
ξi(r) log(1 + xi(r)),
for i = 1, . . . , 5, where x , (x1; . . . ;x5) is the flow decision
vector of the users, ξ , (ξ1; . . . ; ξ5) is a random parameter
corresponding to the different users, R(i) = {1, 2, . . . , ni}
is the set of routes assigned to the i-th user, xi(r) and ξi(r)
are the r-th element of the decision vector xi and the random
vector ξi, respectively. We assume that ξi(r) is drawn from
a uniform distribution for each i and r and the links have
limited capacities given by b.
We may define the routing matrix A that describes the
relation between set of routes R = {1, 2, . . . , 9} and set
of links L = {1, 2, . . . , 20}. Assume that Alr = 1 if route
r ∈ R goes through link l ∈ L and Alr = 0 otherwise.
Using this matrix, the capacity constraints of the links can
be described by Ax ≤ b.
We formulate this model as a stochastic optimization
problem given by
minimize
N∑
i=1
E[fi(xi, ξi)] + c(x) (20)
subject to Ax ≤ b, and x ≥ 0,
where c(x) is the network congestion cost. We consider this
cost of the form c(x) = ‖Ax‖2. Problem (20) is a convex
optimization problem and the optimality conditions can be
stated as a variational inequality given by ∇f(x∗)T (x −
x∗) ≥ 0, where f(x) , ∑Ni=1 E[fi(xi, ξi)] + c(x). Using
our notation in Sec. II, we have
F (x) = −
(
ξ¯1(1)
1 + x1(1)
; . . . ;
ξ¯5(2)
1 + x5(2)
)
+ 2ATAx,
where ξ¯i(ri) , E[ξi(ri)] for any i = 1, . . . , 5 and ri =
1, . . . , ni. It can be shown that the mapping F is strongly
monotone and Lipschitz with specified parameters (cf. [19]).
We solve the bandwidth-sharing problem for 12 different
settings of parameters shown in Table I. We consider 4
parameters in our model that scale the problem. Here, mb
denotes the multiplier of the capacity vector b, mc denotes
the multiplier of the congestion cost function c(x), and
mξ and dξ are two multipliers that parametrize the random
variable ξ. S(i) denotes the i-th setting of parameters. For
each of these 4 parameters, we consider 3 settings where
one parameter changes and other parameters are fixed. This
allows us to observe the sensitivity of the algorithms with
respect to each of these parameters. The SA algorithms
- S(i) mb mc mξ dξ
mb 1 1 1 5 2
2 0.1 1 5 2
3 0.01 1 5 2
mc 4 0.1 2 2 1
5 0.1 1 2 1
6 0.1 0.5 2 1
mξ 7 1 1 1 5
8 1 1 2 5
9 1 1 5 5
dξ 10 1 0.01 1 1
11 1 0.01 1 2
12 1 0.01 1 5
TABLE I: Parameter settings
are terminated after 4000 iterates. To measure the error
of the schemes, we run each scheme 25 times and then
compute the mean squared error (MSE) using the metric
1
25
∑25
i=1 ‖xik − x∗‖2 for any k = 1, . . . , 4000, where i
denotes the i-th sample. Table II and III show the 90%
confidence intervals (CIs) of the error for the DASA and
HSA schemes.
Insights: We observe that DASA scheme performs favor-
ably and is far more robust in comparison with the HSA
schemes with different choice of θ. Importantly, in most of
the settings, DASA stands close to the HSA scheme with
the minimum MSE. Note that when θ = 1 or θ = 10, the
stepsize θk is not within the interval (0,
η−βL
(1+β)2L2 ] for small
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- S(i) DASA - 90% CI HSA with θ = 0.1- 90% CI
mb 1 [2.97e−6,4.66e−6] [1.52e−6,2.37e−6]
2 [2.97e−6,4.66e−6] [1.52e−6,2.37e−6]
3 [1.15e−7,3.04e−7] [2.12e−8,4.92e−8]
mc 4 [4.39e−7,6.55e−7] [1.33e−6,1.80e−6]
5 [1.29e−6,1.97e−6] [9.00e−6,1.20e−5]
6 [3.44e−6,5.36e−6] [2.26e−4,2.53e−4]
mξ 7 [4.29e−5,6.40e−5] [7.92e−5,1.49e−4]
8 [3.18e−5,4.83e−5] [3.46e−5,6.07e−5]
9 [1.83e−5,2.88e−5] [6.12e−6,9.99e−6]
dξ 10 [3.82e−4,5.91e−4] [2.86e+1,2.86e+1]
11 [9.81e−4,1.44e−3] [2.86e+1,2.86e+1]
12 [6.26e−3,8.44e−3] [2.85e+1,2.86e+1]
TABLE II: 90% CIs for DASA and HSA schemes – Part I
- S(i) HSA with θ = 1 - 90% CI HSA with θ = 10 - 90% CI
mb 1 [1.70e−6,2.97e−6] [1.33e−5,1.81e−5]
2 [1.70e−6,2.97e−6] [1.33e−5,1.81e−5]
3 [4.66e−8,1.17e−7] [8.07e−7,2.43e−6]
mc 4 [4.71e−7,8.75e−7] [3.84e−6,5.38e−6]
5 [7.88e−7,1.36e−6] [5.61e−6,7.98e−6]
6 [1.25e−6,1.99e−6] [7.34e−6,1.12e−5]
mξ 7 [2.83e−5,4.75e−5] [1.84e−4,2.75e−4]
8 [1.97e−5,3.39e−5] [1.40e−4,1.99e−4]
9 [1.06e−5,1.85e−5] [8.33e−5,1.13e−4]
dξ 10 [5.50e−1,5.70e−1] [7.23e−5,9.64e−5]
11 [5.45e−1,5.85e−1] [2.85e−4,3.80e−4]
12 [5.47e−1,6.44e−1] [1.77e−3,2.36e−3]
TABLE III: 90% CIs for DASA and HSA schemes – Part II
k and is not feasible in the sense of Prop. 2. Comparing
the performance of each HSA scheme in different settings,
we observe that HSA schemes are fairly sensitive to the
choice of parameters. For example, HSA with θ = 0.1
performs very well in settings S(1), S(2), and S(3), while its
performance deteriorates in settings S(10), S(11), and S(12).
A similar discussion holds for other two HSA schemes. A
good instance of this argument is shown in Figure 2 and 3.
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Fig. 2: DASA vs. HSA schemes – Setting S(4)
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Fig. 3: DASA vs. HSA schemes – Setting S(11)
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered distributed monotone stochastic Nash
games where each player minimizes a convex function on
a closed convex set. We first formulated the problem as
a stochastic VI and then showed that under suitable con-
ditions, for a strongly monotone and Lipschitz mapping,
the SA scheme guarantees almost-sure convergence to the
solution. Next, motivated by the naive stepsize choices of
SA algorithm, we proposed a class of distributed adaptive
steplength rules where each player can choose his own
stepsize independent of the other players from a specified
range. We showed that this scheme provides almost-sure
convergence and also minimizes a suitably defined error
bound of the SA algorithm. Numerical experiments, reported
in Section V confirm this conclusion.
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